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I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The question whether, and under what circumstances, an 
abbreviation1 for a generic2 or merely descriptive term qualifies for 
 
∗ IGT Professor of Intellectual Property Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Annual Works in 
Progress Intellectual Property (WIPIP) Colloquium, held at the Tulane University School of Law.  
The author would like to thank the participants in that colloquium for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
 1. In general, the analysis in this article does not distinguish between initials and other forms 
of abbreviations.  While the nature of a particular abbreviation will certainly affect the outcome of 
the trademark analysis in any given case, the same general analytical questions arise.  Terminology 
is not always consistently used in the relevant case law. The term “abbreviations” covers the 
broadest category, referring to any shortening of a word or phrase.  The rarely-used term 
“initialisms” refers to abbreviations made up of the first letters of all or most words in a phrase.  The 
more common term “acronym,” in its narrowest sense, refers to a subset of initialisms which are 
pronounced as words (e.g., LASIK, NATO, BEARS), unlike ordinary initialisms which are 
pronounced as a series of letters (AARP, AAA, SSRN, DVD).  Some terms which originated as 
acronyms are today recognized as ordinary words (e.g., scuba, laser, radar, sonar).  Some initialisms 
have sprouted word equivalents based on their pronunciation (e.g., deejay, tee-shirt, emcee).  
However, many courts use the term “acronyms” in a broader sense, as a synonym for initialisms.  
Even more detailed distinctions can be drawn among various categories of initialisms, as illustrated 
by the Wikipedia entry on acronyms and initialisms.  See Acronym and initialism, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acronym (last modified Aug. 24, 2011).  While the same general 
analytical questions arise in determining whether an abbreviation of any of these types qualifies for 
trademark protection, the nature of the particular abbreviation in question may affect the outcome of 
the trademark analysis in any given case. 
 2. Generic terms are not eligible for protection as trademarks.  See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810 
(2d Cir. 1999); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976); 
1
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trademark protection has produced a surprising variety of juristic 
responses.  Many courts ask whether, in the minds of the public, the 
abbreviation has a meaning distinct from the underlying words; 
however, courts have expressed the necessary degree of distinction in 
different ways and have entertained widely varying presumptions with 
respect to consumer perceptions.  As a result, the federal courts impose 
inconsistent burdens on the party seeking protection for a trademark that 
takes the form of an abbreviation.  Other courts do not inquire as to 
consumer perceptions at all, and have instead adopted per se rules 
categorically holding such abbreviations to be either inherently 
distinctive or unprotectable at all.  
In this jungle of irreconcilable doctrines, the Second Circuit, which 
ordinarily plays a leadership role in trademark jurisprudence, has issued 
inconsistent and poorly explained rulings, and as a result had little 
influence on doctrinal development, and the Federal Circuit, in its 
modern incarnation, has contributed nothing at all.  The most influential 
and well-considered doctrine has emerged from two sources—the Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) (one of the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor courts) and the Seventh Circuit.  Because these precedents 
conflict—with the CCPA’s approach favoring trademark owners, and 
the Seventh Circuit’s approach disfavoring them—other federal courts 
have faced a choice between opposing approaches, and in some cases 
have developed their own approaches.  Unfortunately, not all of the 
juristic approaches have involved careful analysis, and a number of 
courts have adopted per se rules that automatically favor or disfavor 
trademark owners, with no serious inquiry into the source-identifying 
capacity of the marks. 
This article compares the approaches which different federal courts 
have adopted to address the distinctiveness of abbreviations where the 
underlying expression or information conveyed by the abbreviation is 
 
Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 847 (C.C.P.A.1961); J. 
Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960).  “This rule protects the 
interest of the consuming public in understanding the nature of goods offered for sale, as well as a 
fair marketplace among competitors by insuring that every provider may refer to his goods as what 
they are.” Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(citing CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) 
(“To allow trademark protection for generic terms, i.e., names which describe the genus of goods 
being sold [is impermissible because] a competitor could not describe his goods as what they are.”) 
(citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15cmt. b (“A seller 
. . . cannot remove a generic term from the public domain and cast upon competitors the burden of 
using an alternative name.”)); John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-
Competition Test, 51 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 868 (1984). 
2
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unprotectable either because it is generic or because it is descriptive and 
lacks secondary meaning.  While this study is not intended as a 
comprehensive survey, it is designed to highlight the inconsistencies in 
approaches.  The article concludes with some observations about the 
patterns and trends emerging from the unsettled decisional law. 
II.  THE EVOLVING LAW BY JURISDICTION  
A. The PTO and CCPA Approach 
Decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and 
the PTO have generally focused on whether the abbreviation has the 
same significance to the relevant consumers as the underlying phrase.  
For example, in Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine,3 
the CCPA held that a mark consisting predominantly of the abbreviation 
“B and B” could not be registered as a trademark for a bottled beverage 
consisting of Benedictine and brandy.  Because both parties agreed “that 
the notation ‘B and B’ is a designation of Benedictine and brandy in 
equal parts and that the designation has been popularly and exclusively 
so used in the United States for approximately thirty years,” the court 
held that “the term is necessarily descriptive of the said goods.”4 
In Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp.,5 the PTO 
Commissioner upheld the refusal to register “C.R.A.,” an abbreviation 
for the generic term “cutting room appliances,” as a trademark for 
various devices used in cutting rooms of clothing manufacturers.  The 
Commissioner held that “‘C.R.A.,’ when displayed in association with 
applicant’s name, can have no other meaning than ‘cutting room 
appliances;’ and . . . applicant in its advertising has assiduously taught 
the public to regard the mark as having that significance.”6  Because the 
evidence indicated that “C.R.A.” had “the same significance in the 
trade” as the underlying generic phrase, it was ineligible for 
registration.7 
Opinions of the CCPA consistently recognized that not all 
abbreviations for generic or descriptive terms are themselves generic or 
descriptive, as exemplified by the influential decision in Modern Optics 
 
 3. Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine, 116 F.2d 516, 519 (C.C.P.A. 
1941). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 4 (Com’r Pat. & 
Trademarks Jan. 1, 1943). 
 6. Id. at 1. 
 7. Id. at 2. 
3
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v. Univis Lens Co.8  Modern Optics concerned the initials “CV,” 
standing for “continuous vision,” a term which itself was either 
descriptive or suggestive (a question the court did not decide) as applied 
to trifocal eyeglass lenses.9  The CCPA held that “CV” was not itself 
descriptive for these lenses because there was insufficient evidence that 
CV was “a generally recognized term for multifocal lenses and lens 
blanks.”10  While noting that it was “possible for initial letters to become 
so associated with descriptive words as to become descriptive 
themselves,”11 the court held:  “It does not follow, however, that all 
initials of combinations of descriptive words are ipso facto 
unregistrable.”12  The court distinguished “CV” from other 
abbreviations, such as those in Martell and Breth, which had, in the 
minds of consumers, become synonymous with their underlying generic 
phrases: 
While each case must be decided on the basis of the particular facts 
involved, it would seem that, as a general rule, initials cannot be 
considered descriptive unless they have become so generally 
understood as representing descriptive words as to be accepted as 
substantially synonymous therewith.13 
Although Modern Optics did not expressly articulate the burden of proof 
or persuasion, the emphasized language implies that the party 
challenging the abbreviation’s trademark status bears the burden of 
establishing that consumers assign a descriptive meaning to the 
abbreviation.  The factual record in Modern Optics was mixed in this 
regard; while some consumers viewed CV as a generic term, the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that this perception was the rule 
rather than the exception.14 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has consistently 
followed the Modern Optics15 approach, focusing on whether consumers 
perceive the abbreviation itself as having generic or descriptive meaning, 
 
 8. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 9. Id. at 505. 
 10. Id. at 506. 
 11. Id. 
  12. Id. 
 13. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine, 116 
F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1941) and Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46 
(Com’r Pat. & Trademarks Jan. 1, 1943)). 
 14. Id. at 506. 
 15. Id. at 504. 
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regardless of how they perceive the underlying phrase.16  The TTAB has 
explicitly stated that the question whether initials are generic is distinct 
from the question whether the words they stand for are generic.17  
 
 16. T.T.A.B. decisions refusing trademark protection for abbreviations include: In re Finisar 
Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“SFP” is a common abbreviation for “small 
form-factor pluggable” as applied to optical transceivers); Capital Project Mngt., Inc., v. IMDISI, 
Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1182-83 (T.T.A.B. 2003) (relevant consumers equated “TIA” with 
underlying generic phrase “time impact analysis”); Cont’l Airlines Inc. v. United Air Lines Inc., 53 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (refusing registration for “e-ticket” because public 
understood the term as referring to generic category of electronic ticketing services); In re Unif. 
Prod. Code Council, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 618 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (refusing service mark 
registration for “UPC,” an abbreviation for “Universal Product Code,” because applicant (a 
consortium) used both terms as common descriptive names for machine-readable product codes on 
product packaging); Southwire Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 
(T.T.A.B. 1977) (as perceived by persons in industry, “ALR” is descriptive for electrical wire, 
because it stands for “aluminum revised”); In re Harris-Intertype Corp., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585 
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (“rf” is descriptive for radio transmitters, receivers and parts because it is a 
recognized abbreviation for “radio frequency”); Intel Corp. v. Radiation Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
54 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (“PROM” is merely descriptive as applied to programmable read only 
memories); El Paso Prods. Co. v. C.P. Hall Co., 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 413-14 (T.T.A.B. 1973) 
(“‘DMG’ is recognized or would be recognized and referred to by the average purchaser of dimethyl 
glutarate as the apt and common descriptive abbreviation for the product rather than as a trademark 
serving to identify and distinguish the dimethyl glutarate produced and/or marketed by any one 
person.”); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Borden Co., 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 153, 154 (T.T.A.B. 1967) 
(“‘HOMO’ is merely a recognized abbreviation for the word homogenized and has been so used 
both by opposer and others in the dairy industry. As such, it cannot function as a trademark for 
homogenized milk. . . ”); In re Initial Teaching Alphabet Publ’ns, Inc., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 684 
(T.T.A.B. 1967) (letters “‘i.t.a.’ have a commonly recognized meaning in applicant’s particular 
field” as an abbreviation for “initial teaching alphabet”); Burroughs Corp. v. Microcard Reader 
Corp., 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (refusing registration for “MICR” for machines 
used for viewing magnetic ink characters because “MICR” was used in electronics and banking 
industries as an abbreviation for and interchangeably with “magnetic ink character recognition”); 
and In re Gen. Aniline & Film Corp., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (“PVP” was 
unregistrable for polyvinylpyrrolidone because it was the “accepted abbreviation” for this synthetic 
material). 
  T.T.A.B. decisions holding abbreviations protectable as trademarks include: Racine Indus. 
Inc. v. Bane-Clene Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1838 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (although 
“Professional Cleaners Association” is descriptive or generic, “PCA” is not understood by the 
relevant public as synonymous therewith) (citing Modern Optics, 234 F.2d 504); Sbs Prods. Inc. v. 
Sterling Plastic & Rubber Prods. Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1147, 1149 n.6 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (“SBS” 
is not a weak mark even though derived from the initials of “stuffing box sealant” or “sugar beet 
soap,” absent a showing that these letters are recognized abbreviations for those products); Aloe 
Creme Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (despite phonetic 
equivalence, “ALO” was not generic for opposer’s products made with aloe, because it had acquired 
secondary meaning among customers); In re Pac. Indus., Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 704 (T.T.A.B. 
1970) (because purchasers recognized “EDP” as source indicator for applicant’s carbon paper, it can 
be registered even though the initials may stand for “electronic data processing” or “extra data print-
out”); In re U.S. Catheter & Instrument Corp., 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (where 
record failed to indicate that “NBIH” possessed any known meaning for purchasers of applicant’s 
medical devices, initials were eligible for registration on principal register); Nife, Inc. v. Gould-
Nat’l Batteries, Inc., 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 454-55 (T.T.A.B. 1961) (“The record is wholly 
5
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In its most recent application of Modern Optics, the TTAB was 
asked in In re Thomas Nelson, Inc.,18 to determine whether “NKJV” was 
merely descriptive of the applicant’s bibles because the initials stand for 
the descriptive term “New King James Version.”  The Board outlined a 
three-step inquiry: 
(1) Whether “NKJV” is an abbreviation for “New King James 
Version”; 
(2) Whether “New King James Version” is merely descriptive of 
bibles; and   
(3) Whether a relevant consumer viewing “NKJV” in connection with 
bibles would recognize it as an abbreviation for “New King James 
Version.”19 
The Board derived this inquiry from its 1984 decision in In re Harco 
Corp.,20 where it held that “CPL” (standing for “computerized potential 
log”) was arbitrary, even though the underlying phrase was descriptive, 
because there was no “convincing evidence” that persons coming into 
contact with the applicant’s services would perceive “CPL” as “no more 
than” an abbreviation for the underlying descriptive phrase.21  Thus, the 
Board in Harco placed the burden of proof squarely on the Examining 
Attorney rather than the applicant, and required the Examining Attorney 
to show not only that consumers recognized what “CPL” stood for, but 
also to show that they perceived it as “no more than” an abbreviation for 
the underlying descriptive term.22  In contrast, the Board’s decision in 
Nelson did not expressly discuss the burden of proof.23  Furthermore, in 
its analysis of the third inquiry, the Board imposed a lower burden of 
proof on the Examiner, requiring proof only that consumers “would 
recognize” NKJV as an abbreviation, rather than requiring proof, as in 
Harco, that consumers perceived it as “no more than” an abbreviation.24 
 
insufficient to show that ‘NICAD’ is an abbreviation, contraction or foreshortening for nickel 
cadmium and is commonly used in the trade and by purchasers in lieu of the complete words in 
referring to nickel cadmium batteries.  To the contrary, the record tends to indicate that ‘NICAD’ is 
used and recognized as the trademark for applicant's nickel cadmium batteries.”). 
 17. See Capital Project Mgmt., Inc., v. IMDISI, Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1179 
(T.T.A.B. 2003) (“[W]e must examine whether the letters ‘TIA’ are generally recognized and used 
in the construction field as an accepted abbreviation for ‘time impact analysis.’”) (citing Modern 
Optics, 234 F.2d 504). 
 18. In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1712 (T.T.A.B. 2011). 
 19. Id. at *5.   
 20. In re Harco Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1075 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Nelson, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1712. 
 24. Id. at *6; Harco, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1076. 
6
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Accordingly, while there is some variation in the standard of proof 
required by the TTAB, the Board has consistently followed Modern 
Optics25 in requiring the PTO to establish that consumers perceive the 
abbreviation itself as a descriptive term. 
B. In the Circuits 
Outside of the CCPA, courts have taken divergent approaches to 
analyzing the distinctiveness of abbreviations.  As discussed below, 
while some courts have adopted an analysis consistent with the CCPA 
and TTAB approaches as exemplified by Modern Optics,26 others have 
placed significantly greater—and sometimes insurmountable—burdens 
on parties seeking to protect abbreviations of generic or descriptive 
terms; still others have adopted per se rules either favoring or 
disfavoring the trademark owner.  Only in a small minority of cases have 
these courts offered persuasive reasoning to justify the rules they have 
adopted.  
Many appellate courts have avoided discussing the issue by 
affirming district court decisions without issuing opinions, or by issuing 
perfunctory memorandum opinions.  Thus, while federal case law on this 
topic goes back at least as far as 1924, relatively few appellate decisions 
provide substantive analyses of the issues.  But the few appellate 
opinions, together with the larger number of district court opinions, 
reveal a surprising range of disagreement on the proper approach to 
abbreviations.  Furthermore, even though there is a substantial body of 
CCPA and TTAB precedents available for guidance, these authorities 
have been largely ignored by the district and appellate courts.   
1. Second Circuit:  Turn, and Turn Again27 
Although the Second Circuit is one of the most influential 
jurisdictions in trademark jurisprudence, the decisions of its courts on 
the distinctiveness of abbreviations have been inconsistent and not 
entirely coherent.  Very few opinions have been issued at the appellate 
level and, as discussed below, those opinions have largely been ignored 
by the district courts.  
The pre-Lanham Act opinion in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler28 
provided a generous degree of protection to the “V-8” mark for the 
 
 25. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 26. Id. 
 27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, PART I, act 3, sc. 3. 
 28. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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plaintiff’s vegetable juice product.  The Second Circuit held that the 
mark was “arbitrary and fanciful,” even though many consumers were 
aware that the product consisted of eight vegetable juices, and probably 
understood “V-8” as a shorthand reference to that fact: 
Yet we agree with the court below that the mark is a non-descriptive 
one when used on the container of a vegetable juice cocktail.  The 
letter V by itself no more signifies ‘vegetable’ than it does any other 
word of which it is the initial letter and it is only when resort is had to 
other parts of the label that one may glean that it stands for ‘vegetable.’ 
As much is true of the figure 8, and when put together as they are in 
the mark they are only an arbitrary and fanciful symbol chosen to 
designate the plaintiff’s vegetable juice cocktail.  This mark has 
become the distinctive name of that cocktail not because it is 
inherently descriptive of anything but because it has been so used that 
it has become associated in the public mind as the banner of that 
product.  That does not make the mark descriptive but is only evidence 
of the effectiveness of its use.  By repeatedly advertising the fact that 
its cocktail is made of the combined juices of eight vegetables, the 
plaintiff has undoubtedly taught the purchasing public that V-8 on a tin 
can means such a cocktail. Except for this association, we think, no 
one could reasonably be expected to know that ‘V-8’ designated a 
vegetable juice cocktail, or any other particular thing for that matter, 
unless it be something so described by both shape and number, like an 
eight cylinder automobile engine, for instance, having cylinder[s] set at 
an acute angle to each other.29 
This case stands in sharp contrast to later decisions in the Seventh30 and 
Eleventh31 Circuits, which found abbreviations to be descriptive where 
the merchant’s packaging or marketing materials conveyed (or might in 
the future convey) to consumers the descriptive aspects of the 
abbreviation.  However, the opinion appears to have had no influence on 
subsequent Second Circuit case law regarding abbreviations. 
In 1961, the Second Circuit held in Blisscraft of Hollywood v. 
United Plastics Co.,32 that “Poly” could be protected as a common law 
mark for polyester pitchers, because the defendant provided insufficient 
evidence that the relevant purchasing public equated the term with 
polyethylene (and thus  that the mark was descriptive).  The court 
reached this conclusion in spite of evidence showing that the plaintiff’s 
 
 29. Id. at 36.  
 30. See infra notes 71-96 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 166-212 and accompanying text. 
 32. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961). 
8
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advertising informed consumers that its “Poly Pitcher” and its entire line 
of “Poly Ware” were made of polyethylene.33  The court noted that the 
dictionary meaning of “poly” has nothing to do with polyethylene,34 and 
that the word was also “reminiscent or suggestive of Molly Pitcher of 
Revolutionary time.”35 However, this was uniquely true of the “Poly 
Pitcher” product, and completely inapplicable to the other products in 
the “Poly Ware” line.  Furthermore, the court did not consider the fact 
that a consumer’s inclination to pronounce “Poly” so as to rhyme with 
“Molly” (as opposed to rhyming with “holy”) might be based in part on 
that consumer’s recognition that “Poly” was short for “polyester” 
(although the consumer might not be fully conscious of making that 
association).36  Without considering these potential flaws in its 
reasoning, the court concluded that “Poly Pitcher” was “an incongruous 
expression,” having “the characteristics of a coined or fanciful mark.”37 
Blisscraft38 could be viewed as consistent with the Modern Optics39 
approach, because, however flawed its analysis, the court at least 
considered how consumers actually perceived the term “Poly.”   
On the heels of Blisscraft40, a district court in Connecticut expressly 
relied on Modern Optics41 in holding that the registered mark “hi-g” was 
descriptive for devices designed to withstand a high multiple of 
gravitational force.  The court in General Controls Co. v. Hi-G, Inc. 
observed: 
The parties agree that the letter ‘g’ is a well-known abbreviation or 
symbol for the forces of gravity and acceleration.  ‘Hi-g’ is commonly 
used to express a high multiple of gravitational force which may range 
from a fraction of a ‘g’ up into the hundreds.  The abbreviation of 
‘high’ to ‘hi’ when hyphenated to ‘g’ is a combination so widely 
 
 33. Id. at 701-02. 
 34. “Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1958) defines ‘poly’ as ‘consisting of 
many,’ ‘a plurality,’ ‘a number above the normal.’  In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
we cannot assume that to members of the public at large the word ‘poly,’ either alone or in 
combination with ‘pitcher,’ had any meaning other than that attributed to it by the lexicographer.”  
Id. at 699. 
 35. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d at 700.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d 694. 
 39. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 40. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d 694. 
 41. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d 504. 
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associated with high gravity as to be generally accepted as a 
contraction.42 
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s advertisements had educated its customers 
about the meaning of “hi-g” for nearly two decades.43 
In contrast to these two early precedents, two subsequent decisions 
from the Southern District of New York are clearly at odds with Modern 
Optics44 and take the position that initials are inherently descriptive.  
These cases are Programmed Tax Systems, Inc. v. Raytheon Co. 
(involving “P.T.S.” for “programmed tax systems”)45 and American 
Optical Corp. v. American Olean Tile Co., Inc. (involving “AO” for 
“American Optical”).46  Both decisions involved initials rather than 
shortened forms of longer words, such as “Poly.” In each case, the court 
seemed to state that initials by their very nature cannot be inherently 
distinctive.  American Optical held that “[t]he initials ‘AO’ are letters in 
the alphabet available for use by everyone,” and “[t]here is nothing 
about those initials to conjure up instantaneously the plaintiff.”47  In 
Programmed Tax Systems, the court was even blunter:  “Combinations 
of letters of the alphabet are readily available for use by anyone and are 
merely descriptive.”48  Because all word marks are made up of letters of 
the alphabet (or sometimes numbers), this statement is absurd.  Neither 
opinion explained why letters of the alphabet should be treated 
differently from words in a dictionary, which, depending on context, can 
be arbitrary or suggestive as well as descriptive or generic.  In neither 
case did the court consider the Second Circuit’s Blisscraft49 precedent, 
probably because that case did not involve initials. Furthermore, neither 
of these cases considered how the initials were actually perceived by the 
relevant consumers, whether those consumers typically encountered the 
initials together with the underlying expressions, or the degree of 
distinctiveness in the underlying expressions.  
Still later, the Southern District of New York appears to have 
abandoned the “inherently descriptive” rule for initials and reverted to an 
 
 42. Gen. Controls Co. v. Hi-G, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1962) (citing 
Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504). 
 43. Id. at 156. 
 44. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d 504 . 
 45. Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 46. Am. Optical Corp. v. Am. Olean Tile Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974). 
 47. Id. at 409.  
 48. Programmed Tax Sys., 419 F. Supp. at 1253. 
 49. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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approach resembling Modern Optics50 and Blisscraft51 (although it failed 
to mention either case).  In its 1985 opinion in Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc. 
v. Newman Investment Securities, Inc.,52 the Southern District held that 
the acronym “TOP’s” could be a valid trademark even though it stood 
for the generic term “tender option program.”  The court noted that some 
abbreviations can be arbitrary or fanciful, while acknowledging that 
“commonly understood abbreviations” might be descriptive or generic.53  
Why the change of heart?  Was the Merritt Forbes54 court 
influenced by the fact that “TOP’s” was an acronym—and thus 
pronounceable as a word, like “Poly”—rather than an unpronounceable 
initialism like “P.T.S.” or “AO”? 
In the interim, the Eastern District had also weighed in with two 
opinions on marks that, while combining letters and numbers, could be 
considered to be abbreviations in the sense that they summarized 
information that would otherwise be communicated in lengthier 
expressions.  Nature’s Bounty, Inc. v. Basic Organics55 held that the 
mark “B-100” was descriptive as applied to a vitamin containing 100 
milligrams of vitamin B.  Because it had become commonplace for 
vitamin companies to identify single-entity vitamins by the letter name 
of the vitamin plus its potency, the court observed, “the public now 
assumes it is buying 100 milligrams of a vitamin B complex when it sees 
a vitamin marked with B-100.  B-100 was a term coined by plaintiff, but 
it is now associated with the product.”56  Shortly thereafter, in Nature’s 
Bounty, Inc. v. SuperX Drugs Corp.,57 the same court held that the 
registered mark “KLB 6” was probably suggestive rather than 
descriptive for a food supplement containing kelp, lecithin, and vitamin 
B6.58  The court noted that it would probably have reached this 
conclusion even without the presumption of validity arising from 
registration,59  and distinguished its earlier holding that “B-100” for a 
single-entity vitamin was merely descriptive: 
In the absence of evidence as to actual customer reactions, the acronym 
“KLB 6” appears more suggestive of the nature of the goods than 
 
 50. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 51. Blisscraft, 294 F.2d at 699-702.  
 52. Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 53. Id. at 956. 
 54. Merritt Forbes, 604 F. Supp. 943. 
 55. Nature’s Bounty, Inc. v. Basic Organics, 432 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 56. Id. at 552.   
 57. Nature’s Bounty, Inc. v. SuperX Drugs Corp., 490 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 58. Id. at 54.    
 59. Id. 
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descriptive of the three nutritional ingredients contained therein.  The 
conclusion that KLB 6 is suggestive is strengthened by the fact that 
none of the products introduced as exhibits list the ingredients in the 
order suggested by the designation “KLB 6.” . . .The use of an 
acronym referring to an admixture of not wholly familiar ingredients 
distinguishes this trademark from that used in connection with another 
Nature's Bounty product, “B-100,” a mark held by Judge Neaher to be 
merely descriptive of 100 milligrams of vitamin B and, therefore, not 
entitled to protection against infringement.60  
The court also noted that the defendant had “not demonstrated that 
acronyms are commonly used as generic terms for nutritional 
compounds;”61 in contrast, such a marketplace practice no doubt had 
influenced consumer perceptions that the “B-100” mark in the earlier 
case was descriptive.62 
In 2010, the Western District of New York classified “NYSEG”—
the abbreviation for “New York State Electric & Gas Corp.”—as a 
suggestive mark.63  The court ignored the conflicting authorities from the 
Southern District; for support, it cited precedents from other circuits 
which had recognized that abbreviations can be arbitrary or suggestive.64  
Because “NYSEG” was registered and incontestable, the defendant did 
not challenge its validity, only its strength.65  Even though the 
underlying phrase (which was unregistered) was merely descriptive and 
 
 60. Id. (citations omitted).   
 61. Id. at 54 n.4. 
 62. A later case from the Eastern District involved the incontestable “AAA” mark for the 
American Automobile Association.  The defendant conceded that the mark was arbitrary, and the 
court did not consider the trademark status of the underlying expression.  Am. Auto. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
AAA Auto. Club of Queens, Inc., No. 97 CV 1180 SJ, 1999 WL 97918 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999).  
 63. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Gas & Elec., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 2d 415, 435-36 
(W.D.N.Y. 2010). “A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of goods.  A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea 
of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”  Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 
F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 
4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 64. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(acronym is suggestive if “some operation of the imagination” is necessary to equate the initials 
with the product); Vertos Med., Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09-1411, 2009 WL 3740709, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009) (“MILD,” which stood for generic phrase “minimally invasive lumbar 
decompression,” “d[id] not suggest anything to do with spinal surgery,” and, therefore, was 
arbitrary); Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 166, 
176 (D. Mass. 2009) (“ABLE,” for “Ability Based on Long Experience” was suggestive and “at 
least moderately strong”); Savannah Coll. of Art and Design, Inc. v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929, 
931-32 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“The SCAD mark is distinctive and arbitrary . . . in as much as it is an 
acronym for the college's full name, ‘Savannah College of Art and Design’”). 
 65. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d at 435. 
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had “no more than moderate strength” through secondary meaning,66 the 
court concluded that “NYSEG” was suggestive:   
That the letters of the acronym stand for words that are themselves 
descriptive does not mean that the acronym is likewise descriptive.  
Although “NYS” probably connotes “New York State” to most adults 
rather quickly, the combination “EG” does not seem likely to 
immediately convey to a person that it refers to electricity and gas.67 
It is unlikely that consumers would have attempted to pronounce 
“NYSEG” as a word, nor does it resemble any existing word so as to 
conjure up a dictionary meaning.  (If it did, the court might have ruled 
that it was arbitrary rather than suggestive).  Thus, the Western District’s 
ruling cannot be reconciled with Programmed Tax Systems68 and 
American Optical69 on the basis of pronunciation or dictionary-word 
resemblance. 
Whither the Second Circuit?  With no appellate guidance other than 
Blisscraft,70 the district courts in this circuit have been unable or 
unwilling to develop a consistent body of law with respect to 
abbreviations, either circuit-wide or even within the prolific and 
trademark-savvy Southern District of New York. 
2. Seventh Circuit:  “Heavy Burden” on Trademark Proponent 
The Seventh Circuit initially adopted the Modern Optics71 
approach, but in more recent cases has imposed a greater burden on the 
trademark proponent.   
The Circuit’s early approach is illustrated by FS Services, Inc. v. 
Custom Farm Services, Inc.,72 where the court held that “abbreviations 
for generic terms where they are generally recognized must be treated 
similarly.”73  Applying this rule, the court found that the abbreviation 
“FS” had come to signify “farm service” or “farm supply” to the farmers 
 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 436 (emphasis in original). 
 68. Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).   
 69. Am. Optical Corp. v. Am. Olean Tile Co., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974). 
 70. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 71. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 72. FS Servs., Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972).  An even earlier 
precedent, Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n of Chicago, 81 F. Supp. 127 
(N.D. Ill. 1948), dealt with the trademark status of “Metropolitan” as well as its abbreviation “Met.” 
but found both of them to be well-recognized marks.  Id. at 133. 
 73. FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 674 (emphasis added). 
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within the area where both parties conducted business.74  Because both 
of these phrases were descriptive or generic, the court concluded that 
“FS” was itself descriptive or generic.75 
Ten years later, however, the Seventh Circuit departed from this 
approach.  In National Conference of Bar Examiners  v. Multistate Legal 
Studies, Inc.,76 (“NCBE”) the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s 
unregistered “MBE” mark was generic solely because the underlying 
term from which it was derived, “Multistate Bar Examination,” was 
itself generic. Unlike FS Services,77 the NCBE court did not consider 
whether “MBE” was in fact generally recognized as having generic 
significance.78  Instead, the court held: 
Under settled trademark law if the components of a trade name are 
common descriptive terms, a combination of such terms retains that 
quality.  We note further that plaintiffs also use the initials “MBE” to 
designate their test is of no consequence.  Abbreviations for generic or 
common descriptive phrases must be treated similarly.79 
With no further explanation, the NCBE decision appeared to abandon the 
rule of FS Services,80 and the Modern Optics81 rule long embraced by the 
CCPA and the TTAB, by eliminating the requirement that, to be generic, 
the abbreviation must itself be generally recognized by the relevant 
public as having generic significance.82  
Seven years later, the Seventh Circuit altered its approach yet 
again, turning the seemingly-absolute rule of NCBE into a rebuttable 
presumption, albeit one which is difficult to overcome.  In G. Heileman 
Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,83 the court applied this 
presumption in refusing to recognize the abbreviation “LA” as a 
common law trademark for beer with a low alcohol content.  In the 
opinion below, the district court had applied NCBE to hold that the 
initials “LA” were descriptive solely because they stood for the 
descriptive and protectable phrase “low alcohol”:  “[I]nitials are merely 
 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. Although the plaintiff held several trademark registrations for variations on the “FS” 
mark, none of these involved the letters by themselves.  Id. at 673. 
 76. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
 77. FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 671. 
 78. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs, 692 F.2d at 488. 
 79. Id. (citing FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 674). 
 80. FS Servs., 471 F.2d at 671. 
 81. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 82. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs, 692 F.2d at 488. 
 83. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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short forms of the words for which they stand and should be accorded 
the same degree of protection as those words.”84  The district court 
distinguished the Merritt Forbes85 case from the Southern District of 
New York because the abbreviation in that case “formed an acronym, 
TOP’s.”86  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to hold that the district 
court’s statement of the law was legal error per se.87  Nonetheless, the 
appellate court went on to articulate a somewhat different rule, holding 
that initials are rebuttably presumed to convey the same meaning to the 
public as the underlying words they represent: 
As a practical matter, there must be a presumption that initials mean, 
or will soon come to mean, to the public the descriptive phrase from 
which they are derived.  Although the matter is certainly not 
foreclosed, there is a heavy burden on a trademark claimant seeking to 
show an independent meaning of initials apart from the descriptive 
words which are their source.88 
Placing such a “heavy burden” on the trademark proponent, the court 
explained, was justified by “the policy of the trademark laws to guard 
against unjustified appropriation from the public domain of terms 
needed to perform a descriptive function,” and by “the general rule that 
the claimant of trademark law protection bears the burden of establishing 
by a preponderance of the evidence that an unregistered mark is entitled 
to trademark status.”89 
Even as it imposed a “heavy burden” on the trademark proponent 
seeking to establish trademark significance for the abbreviation of a 
generic phrase, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its analysis was 
focused on situations where the public encounters both the initials and 
the underlying phrase in a way that establishes a connection between the 
two.90  Nonetheless, the court speculated that only rarely would the 
public encounter initials without associating them with an underlying 
expression.91    
 
 84. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1493 n.48 
(E.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d, G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th 
Cir. 1989).   
 85. Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 86. G. Heileman Brewing, 676 F. Supp. at 1493 n.48. 
 87. G. Heileman Brewing, 873 F.2d at 994. 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Even if consumers did not initially make the connection, the court suggested, they might 
do so in the future: 
It is possible, although not likely, that the public might become acquainted with initials 
15
LaFrance: Initial Impressions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
9-LAFRANCE MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:32 AM 
216 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:201 
When that “rare” instance occurred twelve years later, however, in 
CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc.,92 the Seventh Circuit treated 
“CAE” as a “strong and distinctive” mark,93 without citing any of its 
prior rulings on abbreviations, and without even considering the strength 
or distinctiveness of the underlying phrase. As used by the owner of the 
registered mark, the abbreviation originally stood for “Canadian 
Aviation Electronics,” and as used by the applicant (who sought to 
register the same mark for different goods and services), it stood for 
“Clean Air Engineering.”  The Court of Appeals held that the registered 
“CAE” mark “is an unpronounceable set of letters and thus falls into the 
category of letter marks generally accorded broader trademark protection 
because ‘it is more difficult to remember a series of arbitrarily arranged 
letters than it is to remember words, figures, phrases or syllables.’”94 The 
court found this principle to be “particularly applicable here because the 
letters CAE appear without reference to the underlying words from 
which they were originally derived.”95  The court’s failure to apply the 
more rigorous analysis of its prior cases to the abbreviation at issue in 
this case may reflect the failure of both parties to brief the issue, since 
both the registrant/opposer and the applicant wanted the mark to be 
protected.  It also reflects a muddling of two factors relevant to the 
likelihood of confusion analysis:  the strength of the senior mark, and the 
degree of similarity between the senior and junior marks.   
 
used in connection with a product without ever being aware that the initials were derived 
from, and stood for, a descriptive phrase or generic name.  This is conceivable, though 
rather improbable, because the connection between the initials and the descriptive words 
is in normal course very likely to become known.  The process of identifying initials with 
the set of descriptive words from which they are derived is, after all, usually fairly 
simple.  Ordinarily, no flight of imagination or keen logical insight is required.  There is 
a natural assumption that initials do generally stand for something.  All that needs to be 
done is to convert the next-to-obvious to the obvious by answering the inevitable 
question: What do the initials stand for?  As a rule, no very extensive or complicated 
process of education or indoctrination is required to convey that initials stand for 
descriptive words. 
 Id. at 993-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 92. 267 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 93. Id. at 685. 
 94. Id. at 684 (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
23:33, at 23-97 (2001), and citing Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1548 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding TMS and TMM confusingly similar)). 
 95. Id.  
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3. Eighth Circuit:  Embracing Modern Optics 
On facts similar to G. Heileman Brewing,96 the Eighth Circuit 
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s approach, holding in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 
v. Stroh Brewery Co.97 that initials may be suggestive even where they 
stand for an underlying descriptive or generic phrase.  Based on 
consumer survey evidence, the district court in this case found that the 
“LA” mark for low alcohol beer was suggestive rather than descriptive 
or generic:  
In this Court’s opinion, a term should not be equated with generic or 
descriptive phrases merely because the individual letters of the term 
may be interpreted to be initials of that generic or descriptive phrase.  
As explained more fully below, the real test is the consumer's 
perception of such term. 
. . .  
[I]t is this Court's opinion that the study supports a conclusion that 
“LA”, when placed prominently on a can of beer as the sole brand 
name, stands for an idea which requires some operation of the 
imagination to connect it with the product, and therefore is suggestive 
in nature.98 
Citing Modern Optics99 with approval,100 the Eighth Circuit agreed with 
the district court that initials, like other types of marks, are suggestive 
when “some operation of the imagination is required” to connect the 
initials with the product.101  Defendant Stroh had argued that this holding 
was legal error, because initials which stand for a phrase that is generic 
or merely descriptive should be equated with that phrase as a matter of 
law.102  Rejecting this, the appellate court held that “if some operation of 
the imagination is required to connect the initials with the product, the 
initials cannot be equated with the generic phrase but are suggestive in 
nature, thereby rendering them protectable.”103  In contrast to the 
Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit did not suggest that such a scenario 
would be rare or improbable.104  
 
 96. G. Heileman Brewing, 873 F.2d at 985. 
 97. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 98. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 587 F. Supp. 330, 335, 337 (E.D. Mo. 1984), 
aff’d, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 99. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 100. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 750 F.2d at 636. 
 101. Id. at 635-36. 
 102. Id. at 635. 
 103. Id. at 635-36. 
 104. Id.  
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A recent district court decision in Minnesota presented the 
abbreviation question in reverse.  In American Ass’n for Justice v. 
American Trial Lawyers Ass’n,105 the defendant challenged the validity 
of the common law trademark “Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America” (which the plaintiff was transitioning away from but had not 
yet abandoned), but did not challenge the validity of the plaintiff’s 
registered mark, “ATLA.”106  The court found that consumers did not 
distinguish between the initials “ATLA” and the underlying phrase; the 
evidence indicated that consumers perceived the two marks as 
interchangeable source indicators.107  The court briefly examined the 
underlying phrase to determine whether it was suggestive or descriptive, 
but undertook no such analysis of the abbreviation.108  Nor did the court 
distinguish between the abbreviation and the underlying phrase in 
determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion with the 
defendant’s “American Trial Lawyers Association” mark.109  This 
approach seems inconsistent with the court’s conclusion that consumers 
perceived both “ATLA” and “Association of Trial Lawyers of America” 
as indicating the same source; if that were true, then by conceding that 
the abbreviation was a valid mark, the defendant also conceded that the 
underlying phrase was a valid mark.110 
While other district court decisions in the Eighth Circuit have 
addressed abbreviation marks, they have involved abbreviations that 
were registered marks; thus, the analysis in those cases has been 
truncated due to the presumption of validity.111   
 
 105. Am. Ass’n for Justice v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1144 (D. Minn. 
2010). 
 106. Id. at 1141. 
 107. Id. at 1144. 
 108. Id. at 1142. 
 109. Id. at 1144 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, 873 F.2d 985, 994 
(7th Cir. 1989)). 
 110. Id.  
 111. In Community of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Miller, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1316 
(W.D. Mo. 2007), a district court summarily rejected a genericness challenge to the incontestable 
marks “RLDS” and “Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints” without making any 
separate analysis of the abbreviation.  Deference went a bit too far, however, in Hubbs Machinery & 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brunson Instrument Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2009), 
where the district court refused to invalidate the registered mark “SM,” which stood for the generic 
phrase “sphere mount,”  on the erroneous ground that genericness cannot invalidate a registered 
mark.  
18
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4. Fourth Circuit:  Erratic Decisionmaking   
The inconsistency of the decisions on abbreviation marks that have 
emerged from courts in the Fourth Circuit rivals that of the Second 
Circuit. 
The early cases offered little useful guidance.  In the 1970 case of 
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet,112 the Fourth Circuit 
considered a mark—“comsat,” used for the plaintiff’s communications 
satellite services—that was a cross between a coined word and an 
abbreviation.  Because the component “com” is associated with a variety 
of concepts (computers, community, communication), the court held that 
it was not uniquely associated with communications; accordingly, 
“comsat” was not descriptive.113  
In America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp.,114 an obtusely-reasoned 
2001 decision, the Fourth Circuit held that “IM” (for “instant 
messaging”) was not generic, but was nonetheless not an enforceable 
mark.  Finding substantial evidence of widespread generic use of the 
term “IM” to refer to instant messaging regardless of source, the court 
held that this evidence outweighed AOL’s conclusory assertions that the 
term was uniquely associated with its own messaging service.115  While 
the district court explicitly held that both IM and “instant message” were 
generic,116 the Fourth Circuit declined to hold that IM was generic, but 
held—without explanation—that IM was “unenforceable” as a mark.117    
In 2004, a district court in the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the 
Modern Optics118 approach, holding in U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops v. Media Research Center119 that initials which stand for 
descriptive phrases are themselves inherently descriptive:  “Initials for a 
descriptive phrase merely represent short forms of the words for which 
they stand and should receive the same degree of protection as those 
 
 112. Commc’ns Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970). 
 113. Id. at 1248. 
 114. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 823 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding district 
court’s conclusion that abbreviation “IM”  for instant messaging lacked trademark significance 
because it was synonymous with the service itself), cert. dismissed, Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T, 534 
U.S. 946 (2001). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 119. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Media Research Ctr., 432 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. 
Va. 2006). 
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words.”120  Accordingly, the court held that “CNS” was descriptive 
simply because it stood for the descriptive phrase “Catholic News 
Service.”121  When the plaintiff pointed out that the TTAB had found 
“CNS” to be inherently distinctive, the court observed: 
[T]he TTAB, as it expressly acknowledged in its decision, was 
constrained to follow Modern Optics regardless of whether that case 
has received favorable treatment from other Courts of Appeals.  In 
fact, courts in this Circuit have adopted the legal standard established 
in Heileman to determine whether trademarks consisting solely of 
initials qualify for protection under the Lanham Act. Even the case 
[Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp.] that Plaintiff cites as evidence that 
this Court relies upon the Modern Optics test for evaluating the 
protectability of initial marks in fact adopted the Heileman test and 
cited with approval other cases from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
that did the same.  As discussed above, since “Catholic News Service” 
is merely descriptive, the initials for that name are likewise merely 
descriptive and will receive protection only upon a showing of 
secondary meaning.122 
Despite this attempt at a strong doctrinal pronouncement, no court 
in the Fourth Circuit (or elsewhere) has ever cited Catholic Bishops for 
this proposition.123  Indeed, subsequent Fourth Circuit decisions reveal 
the circuit’s continuing confusion over the analytical framework for 
abbreviations.  In its 2009 decision in George & Co. v. Imagination 
Entertainment Ltd.,124 the Fourth Circuit appeared to follow the general 
path of Catholic Bishops,125 assessing an abbreviation without regard to 
consumer perception.  George & Co. involved the registered mark 
“LCR,” which stood for “LEFT CENTER RIGHT.”126  In finding that 
the abbreviation was suggestive, the court of appeals reluctantly deferred 
to the judgment of the PTO and the district court only because the 
infringement defendant offered no evidence of descriptiveness to rebut 
the presumption of distinctiveness that arose from the PTO’s registration 
 
 120. Id. at 623 (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 
1436, 1493 (E.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d, G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 
F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 625 (citation omitted). 
 123. Catholic Bishops has been cited only once, and for a different proposition.  See Field of 
Screams, LLC v. Olney Boys & Girls Cmty. Sports Ass’n, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25634, at *27 (D. 
Md. Mar. 14, 2011). 
 124. George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 395 nn.11-12 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
 125. Catholic Bishops, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 616. 
 126. George & Co., 575 F.3d at 395 nn.11-12. 
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of the mark without evidence of secondary meaning.127  However, the 
appellate court expressed doubt as to the correctness of their 
conclusions, noting that “LEFT CENTER RIGHT” is “a descriptive 
term” that describes “a generic dice game,” and that the PTO “has 
repeatedly found LEFT CENTER RIGHT descriptive.”128  The court 
thus implied that LCR itself was either descriptive or generic, but it 
seemed to draw this conclusion simply from the nature of the underlying 
phrase, rather than considering how LCR was actually used or perceived 
by the relevant consumers.129   
In contrast, another 2009 decision by the Fourth Circuit focused 
squarely on consumer perception, although the result was to find the 
abbreviation unprotectable—the same result that would have followed if 
the court had focused on the underlying expression.  In OBX-Stock, Inc. 
v. Bicast, Inc.,130 the court held that OBX, a registered trademark which 
the registrant had coined as an abbreviation for the Outer Banks of North 
Carolina, was perceived by consumers as synonymous with the Outer 
Banks, and not as a source indicator for any goods or services; thus, the 
abbreviation was geographically descriptive and lacked secondary 
meaning.  Although the court declined to cancel the registrations,131 it 
noted that its holding would prevent the mark from becoming 
incontestable.  Apparently the registrant had initially been rebuffed in its 
efforts to register OBX.  However, the PTO eventually bowed to 
political pressure from North Carolina’s congressional delegation and 
granted the registrations in violation of its own well-established 
standards.132  The PTO’s obvious error of judgment no doubt explains 
the court’s willingness to overcome the presumption of validity that 
attaches to registered marks.  It seems clear that the Fourth Circuit 
would have found the mark in this case invalid whether it focused on the 
abbreviation itself or on the underlying expression.  
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 395 n.12. 
 129. Id. 
 130. OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 131. This was partly on procedural grounds (i.e., the defendant failed to file a counterclaim for 
cancellation) and partly because, in the court’s view, the defendant’s “evidence d[id] not 
conclusively establish that every one of” the plaintiff’s registrations should be cancelled.  Id. at 342-
43. 
 132. Id. at 342. 
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5. First Circuit:  Treating Abbreviations Independently 
In the First Circuit, courts have analyzed the distinctiveness of 
abbreviations independently of the underlying expression.  None of these 
opinions clearly articulates a presumption for or against trademark 
protection, or expressly addresses the respective burdens of proof of the 
parties advocating or opposing protection.  The opinions are largely 
consistent with Modern Optics,133 with some minor departures.    
In Grove Laboratories. v. Brewer & Co.,134 a decision predating 
Modern Optics,135 Breth,136 and Martell,137 the First Circuit reversed its 
own conclusion as to the distinctiveness of a mark consisting of the 
initials “LBQ” (standing for “laxative bromo quinine”) enclosed in a 
circle.  In the initial hearing, the First Circuit held that the abbreviation 
was descriptive because the underlying phrase was descriptive, and 
because the underlying phrase appeared together with the abbreviation 
on the labels of medicine bottles.138  In a subsequent review, however, 
the court concluded that its prior conclusion was erroneous, and that the 
mark was arbitrary or fanciful despite the descriptiveness of the 
underlying phrase:  
The letters as thus arranged and embossed on the tablets are not in 
themselves descriptive of the ingredients which the tablets contain, but 
are arbitrary and fanciful.  It is only when they are used on the labels in 
association with the words ‘Laxative Bromo Quinine’ that one is led to 
inquire whether they may or may not be descriptive.  But being 
arbitrary and fanciful when adopted and embossed upon the tablets we 
think that they do not lose that character when printed on the label, 
enclosed in a circle.139   
This analysis anticipates both Modern Optics140 and the Second Circuit’s 
Blisscraft141 decision; the fact that the abbreviation was sometimes 
accompanied by the underlying descriptive phrase was relevant to the 
analysis, but it was not conclusive, serving only to prompt an “inquiry” 
 
 133. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 134. Grove Labs. v. Brewer & Co., 103 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1939). 
 135. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504. 
 136. Breth v. Cutting Room Appliances Corp., 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46, 4 (Com’r Pat. & 
Trademarks Jan. 1, 1943). 
 137. Martell & Co. v. Societe Anonyme De La Benedictine, Distillerie De La Liqueur De 
L’Ancienne Abbaye De Fecamp, 116 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1941). 
 138. Id. at 178. 
 139. Id. at 179.   
 140. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504. 
 141. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
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into descriptiveness.142  Although the court did not expressly articulate a 
presumption for or against trademark protection for abbreviations, it 
seems to have tacitly embraced a presumption in favor of such 
protection, rebuttable by proof of descriptiveness.143 
More recently, the First Circuit was asked to decide whether the 
term “duck” was generic for a tour in an amphibious vehicle.  The term 
“duck” is a colloquial term commonly substituted for the abbreviation 
DUKW, which refers to a class of World War II amphibious vehicles 
made by General Motors and first deployed by the U.S. military in 1942 
(and pronounced the same as “duck”).144  DUKW itself is not, strictly 
speaking, an acronym, but it is the abbreviation that was adopted (by the 
Army or GM, depending on the source) to identify this class of 
vehicles.145  The “D” stands for 1942, “U” for utility, “K” for either 
front-wheel drive or 6-wheel drive or all-wheel drive, depending on the 
source, and “W” for two powered rear axles.146  In Boston Duck Tours, 
LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC,147 the district court had concluded that 
“duck” was not generic for the service of offering tours in such vehicles, 
because the tours did not involve the creatures known as ducks.  The 
First Circuit held that this was clear error.148  Instead of analyzing 
whether the term “duck” was generic, the appellate court held that the 
district court should have analyzed the entire term “duck tours.”149  
Because the term “duck tours” was widely used generically to refer to 
tours utilizing these amphibious vehicles,150 the phrase was generic.  
In a discussion of abbreviations, this case is, to be sure, an “odd 
duck.”  Both the district court and the appellate court focused on the 
meaning of the word “duck” rather than on the abbreviation for which it 
was a phonetically-identical substitute.151  Yet both opinions are still 
consistent with the Modern Optics152 approach.  The average consumer 
was probably not even aware of the expression DUKW, much less the 
generic or description terms which it abbreviated.  To the average 
consumer, a “duck” was a common water-bird; this meaning was 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See DUKW, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DUKW. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 148. Id. at 18. 
 149. Id. at 18-19. 
 150. Id. at 19-21. 
 151. Id. at 18-21.  
 152. Modern Optics Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
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reinforced by the logos and other graphics used by duck tour services, 
several of which featured cartoon-like ducks.153  Thus, neither the 
consumers nor the courts equated the term with the generic expression 
from which it was derived.154 
As in other circuits, the presumption of validity that attaches to 
registered marks has influenced decisions in the First Circuit regarding 
abbreviations for generic phrases.155 
6. D.C. Circuit:  Rejecting Modern Optics 
In a 1924 decision that appeared to anticipate the Modern Optics156 
approach, the D.C. Circuit held that the initials “MM” were descriptive 
specifically because they always appeared together with “malted milk” 
on the trademark owner’s product label, because this juxtaposition made 
clear to consumers what the initials stood for. 157  
In 1989, however, the Circuit implicitly rejected Modern Optics,158 
concluding in Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans 
Foundation159 that the initials “BVA” were generic simply because the 
phrase for which they stood (“Blinded Veterans Association”) was itself 
generic.  The district court’s analysis of the marks, while brief, had 
assessed the distinctiveness of both marks, concluding that while both of 
them were descriptive, both had been used in a manner that gave rise to 
secondary meaning: 
Plaintiff BVA has, from its inception, been known by no other name.  
It has employed its initials as a logo, on its official publication and 
elsewhere, for the same period.  And it has continuously promoted 
 
 153. Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 8. 
 154. A subsequent district court decision, Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. National 
Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2009), also involved an acronym with a word-
equivalent.  The plaintiff’s unregistered mark, “ABLE,” stood for “Ability Based on Long 
Experience.”  The court held that “ABLE” was both suggestive, id. at 171-72, and “at least 
moderately strong,” id. at 176, and this conclusion was not altered by the mark’s acronym status.  
The court did not analyze the distinctiveness of the underlying phrase.  Id. at 172.  If it had, it seems 
unlikely that the court would have held it to be descriptive or generic as to the plaintiff’s services 
(helping older workers find employment). 
 155. E.g., Diomed, Inc. v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A.03-12498 RWZ, 2006 WL 
516756 (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2006) (although evidence was mixed as to whether doctors used “EVLT” 
as a generic term for “endovenous laser therapy (or treatment),” as a registered mark the 
abbreviation was presumptively valid; also, defendant implicitly conceded it was valid even though 
the underlying term was generic). 
 156. Modern Optics Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 157. Horlick’s Malted Milk Co. v. Borden Co., 295 F. 232 (D.C. Cir. 1924). 
 158. Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 504. 
 159. 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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itself, without hiatus, as the preeminent private voluntary proponent of 
the interests of blinded former U.S. service personnel, and its 
‘product,’ i.e., the services it can render to and for them, for such a 
length of time, and at such effort and expense, that the Court concludes 
the name ‘Blinded Veterans Association,’ and the initials ‘BVA,’ have, 
indeed, acquired a secondary meaning for which BVA is entitled to 
protection against all competitors employing a name which is 
confusingly similar.  The Court is reinforced in that conclusion by both 
the defendant's startling success in its maiden fundraising venture with 
no history of significant accomplishment, and by the tenacity with 
which it seeks to preserve its right to use the name it has chosen for 
itself.160 
In rejecting this analysis, the D.C. Circuit explained its position in a 
brief and conclusory footnote, citing only the Seventh Circuit’s decisions 
in NCBE161 and FS Services162:  
“We need not deal separately with the question whether the initials 
‘BVA’ are generic; if the full name is generic, an abbreviation is treated 
similarly.”163  It is clear that the D.C. Circuit gave no serious thought to 
the question of whether and how abbreviations can achieve independent 
trademark status.164   
7. Eleventh Circuit:  Burdening the Trademark Proponent 
As discussed below, district court decisions involving abbreviations 
in the Eleventh Circuit have been inconsistent and occasionally 
downright bizarre.  However, a 2007 decision at the appellate level may 
have stabilized the law of the Circuit. 
In one of the oddest district court decisions involving abbreviations, 
the Middle District of Florida held in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. A-B 
Distributors, Inc.165 that Anheuser-Busch’s “A-B” mark was descriptive.  
The A-B court relied in part on the reasoning of the Southern District of 
New York in American Optical, which held that initials are “letters in 
 
 160. Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Found., 680 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D.D.C. 1988), 
vacated and remanded, 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 161. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs & Educ. Testing Serv. v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 
692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 162. FS Servs., Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972).   
 163. Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1041 n.12. 
 164. Despite its poverty of analysis, this part of the court’s holding was cited with approval by 
the Fifth Circuit in Society of Finanial Examiners v. National Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners, 
41 F.3d 223, 226 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995), discussed in the text accompanying notes 248-53 infra. 
 165. 910 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
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the alphabet available for use by anyone.”166  Although the Florida court 
also stated the reasonable proposition that initials are descriptive if they 
impart information directly,167 it held that “A-B” was a descriptive mark 
even though it did not convey any information about the qualities of the 
product (beer) with which it was associated.   The court reached this 
conclusion without ever considering whether the underlying phrase 
“Anheuser-Busch” was itself descriptive.168  (It might be viewed as such, 
if consumers perceive both parts of the name as surnames; if not, it could 
be fanciful.).  Under this “alphabet” approach, a court could treat initials 
as descriptive even if they abbreviated a fanciful or arbitrary mark.169 
Three years later, however, the same district court addressed the 
memorable acronym “BEARS,” which stood for “British-European-
American Racing Series.”  The court held that the acronym’s 
distinctiveness should be examined separately from that of the 
underlying expression; based on evidence of consumer perception, 
“BEARS” was an arbitrary mark even though the underlying phrase was 
descriptive.170  This decision, American Historic Racing Motorcycle 
Ass’n, Ltd. v. Team Obsolete Promotions (“AHRMA”),171 was affirmed 
without opinion by the Eleventh Circuit in 2000.172  The district court 
undertook a detailed analysis of the “BEARS” mark, and considered the 
leading precedents from the TTAB and CCPA as well as the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits:  
BEARS is an arbitrary mark rather than a descriptive mark for several 
reasons.  On its face, BEARS does not convey the phrase, British-
American-European Racing Series.  Unlike an abbreviation such as 
MBE, which stands for Multistate Bar Examination, BEARS doubles 
for an animal and an abbreviation.  Consequently, a consumer who 
sees BEARS in connection with motorcycle racing may associate the 
word with any number of things, and not immediately think that 
BEARS is an abbreviation.  This is particularly true because, aside 
from the AHRMA rulebook and articles discussing BEARS, the 
 
 166. Id. at 593. 
 167. Id. (citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 996-97 (7th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Am. Historic Racing Motorcycle Ass’n, LTD. v. Team Obsolete Promo., 33 F. Supp. 2d 
1000, 1005 (M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d without reported opinion, 233 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Am. Historic Racing, 233 F.3d 577. 
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promotional materials do not feature BEARS together with its 
underlying phrase.173 
Finally, the evidence showed that motorcycle racing fans in fact 
perceived “BEARS” not as a generic motorcycle racing class but as a 
mark for the plaintiff’s entertainment services;174 rather than treating this 
as evidence of secondary meaning (which would be essential to validity 
if the mark were descriptive), the court held that this evidence of 
consumer perception supported its conclusion that the “BEARS” mark 
was arbitrary.175  Ironically, the district court in AHRMA cited the A-B 
case for the proposition that “[a]n abbreviation is treated similarly to its 
underlying phrase where the abbreviation imparts the original generic or 
descriptive connotation,”176 a proposition that is neither supported nor 
articulated in the A-B decision. 
Consumer perceptions in this case were clearly influenced by the 
fact that “BEARS” conjures up the image of an animal.177  This strong 
association probably overwhelmed any consumer awareness that 
“BEARS” was an acronym at all, thus making it irrelevant whether the 
underlying phrase was descriptive or even generic.  On the other hand, if 
the underlying phrase were very familiar to the relevant consumers, then 
arguably the mental association with bears and the mental association 
with the descriptive or generic meaning of the underlying phrase would 
co-exist—in the minds of different consumers or even within the mind 
of an individual consumer.  In that case, it would be less clear that 
“BEARS” should be treated as an arbitrary mark.  The situation would 
be analogous to other dual-purpose marks, such as those which have 
both functional and nonfunctional aspects,178 or those which are 
perceived as generic by some consumers but not by others.179  At the 
very least, AHRMA illustrates the same phenomenon seen in the 
Blisscraft180 (“Poly Pitcher”) and Merritt Forbes181 (“TOP’s”) opinions 
 
 173. Am. Historic Racing, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1004.  
 177. Id. at 1005. 
 178. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 
203-04 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that cheerleaders’ uniforms had both functional and nonfunctional 
features). 
 179. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579-80 (2d Cir. 
1963) (finding that substantial majority of public perceived “thermos” as generic, but minority still 
perceived it as a trademark). 
 180. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 181. Merritt Forbes & Co. Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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from the Second Circuit and, to a lesser degree, the Boston Duck 
Tours182 (“DUCK”) opinion from the First Circuit183—if the 
abbreviation constitutes (or at least conjures up) a word that does not 
itself describe the goods in question, then courts will treat the trademark 
status of the underlying expression as irrelevant.  
The Eleventh Circuit finally addressed abbreviations at the 
appellate level in the 2007 case of Welding Services, Inc. v. Forman.184  
Its holding in this case supports independent analysis of the abbreviation 
and the underlying expression, and appears to strike a middle course 
between the Modern Optics185 approach burdening the trademark 
opponent and the Seventh Circuit’s “heavy burden” on the trademark 
proponent.186   
The abbreviation at issue in Welding Services was “WSI,” derived 
from “Welding Services, Inc.”187  The Eleventh Circuit held that the 
phrase “welding services” was generic, and that the plaintiff had failed 
to establish the distinctiveness of “WSI.”188  However, the court  did not 
hold that “WSI” was generic.189  Instead, the court articulated the 
following rule:  “Abbreviations of generic words may become 
protectable if the party claiming protection for such an abbreviation 
shows that the abbreviation has a meaning distinct from the underlying 
words in the mind of the public.”190 
The court also noted the Seventh Circuit’s admonition in G. 
Heileman Brewing191 that the proponent of trademark protection for an 
abbreviation bears a “heavy burden” in demonstrating that the 
abbreviation has a meaning distinct from the underlying generic or 
descriptive phrase.192  While the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly adopt 
or endorse this “heavy burden” rule, and its analysis does not appear to 
impose such a burden, its analysis does place the burden of proof on the 
trademark proponent, who must establish that the abbreviation conveys 
 
 182. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 183. See also Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l Able Network, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 
2d 166 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding that “ABLE” was suggestive without even considering the 
underlying expression).  See supra note 155. 
 184. 509 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 185. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 186. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d 1351. 
 187. Id. at 1355. 
 188. Id. at 1360. 
 189. Id. at 1359. 
 190. Id.   
 191. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 192. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1359. 
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to consumers a meaning distinct from its underlying expression.193  This 
is the opposite of the Modern Optics194 burden of proof. 
In the decision below, the district court had found “WSI” 
protectable, based on the factors which have traditionally been 
considered as circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning:  Welding 
Services had used the abbreviation since 1990, had spent significant 
amounts on advertising, and had generated significant revenues.195  
However, the Eleventh Circuit held that this circumstantial evidence of 
secondary meaning was insufficient to resolve the question whether 
“WSI” had a meaning distinct from the underlying generic phrase:  
“[T]he question of whether the abbreviation has a discrete meaning in 
the minds of the public from the generic words for which it stands 
requires a different kind of evidence.”196  The court did not specify what 
this “different kind of evidence” might be.197  It noted merely that “[t]he 
only evidence in the record relevant to this question shows Welding 
Services has not created a separate meaning for the abbreviation.”198   
Welding Services presented only circumstantial evidence to 
establish that WSI had secondary meaning—length of use, advertising 
expenditures, and sales volume—and this evidence was derived from 
marketing materials in which the “WSI” abbreviation was always 
displayed immediately next to the words “Welding Services, Inc.”199  In 
the Eleventh Circuit’s view, it was, therefore, likely that consumers gave 
the abbreviation the same meaning as the generic phrase that it 
accompanied.  Welding Services failed to submit any evidence—
consumer surveys or testimony, for example—demonstrating that 
consumers separately recognized “WSI” as a source indicator.  By 
always displaying the abbreviation and the generic phrase jointly, 
Welding Services was, in effect, teaching consumers to see “WSI” as a 
generic term.  
Under the Welding Services approach, if the expression underlying 
an abbreviation is generic or descriptive, then the circumstantial 
evidence which ordinarily helps to establish secondary meaning will be 
of little or no value unless the abbreviation is presented to the consumer 
 
 193. Id. at 1359-60. 
 194. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 195. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1360. 
 196. Id. at 1359.    
 197. Id. at 1360. 
 198. Id. at 1359. 
 199. Id. at 1360. 
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separately from the underlying expression. 200  Teaching the consumer to 
equate the two will be fatal to a claim that the abbreviation is distinctive.  
In contrast, under the Second Circuit’s opinions in Standard Brands 
(“V-8”) 201 and Blisscraft (“Poly Pitcher”) ,202 marketing materials which 
taught consumers the underlying meaning of abbreviations did not 
undermine the distinctiveness of those abbreviations. 
While the appellate court held that Welding Services had failed to 
show that “WSI” was protectable, it stopped short of holding that the 
abbreviation was generic.203  Thus, it did not adopt the Seventh Circuit’s 
rebuttable presumption that abbreviations for generic terms are 
themselves generic.  Although the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly 
state that it was imposing the “heavy burden” of proof which was 
applied in G. Heileman Brewing,204 it did require WSI to provide 
secondary meaning evidence that was specific to the “WSI” 
abbreviation.205  To satisfy the court, WSI could have supplied direct 
evidence of consumer perceptions, such as consumer surveys or direct 
consumer testimony. 
The Eleventh Circuit did not consider the possibility that “WSI” 
was inherently distinctive by virtue of being arbitrary, fanciful, or 
suggestive; there is no indication that Welding Services even raised the 
issue of inherent distinctiveness. 
More recently in 2009, a district court in Florida interpreted 
Welding Services206 as adopting the Seventh Circuit’s “heavy burden” of 
proof.  In Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Systems Technology, Inc.,207 
the Middle District of Florida held that “UNS” lacked a meaning distinct 
from the descriptive phrase “universal night sight.”  Citing Welding 
Services,208 G. Heileman Brewing,209 and AHRMA (the “BEARS” 
 
 200. This problem has also afflicted sound marks that are an intrinsic feature of the product or 
service being advertised, such as alarm sounds and ringtones.  E.g., In re Vertex Group LLC, 89 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694 (T.T.A.B. 2009); Nextel Commc’n, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1393 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
 201. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 202. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 203. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether WSI’s stylized 
logo was so lacking in distinction to warrant summary judgment for the defendant on this issue 
alone, because it also found that WSI presented insufficient evidence of a likelihood of confusion 
between the parties’ marks.   
 204. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 205. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 206. Id. at 1351. 
 207. 647 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 208. Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1351. 
 209. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 985. 
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case),210 the court stated that “[t]he party claiming protection has a 
‘heavy burden’ to show an independent meaning for an abbreviation of a 
descriptive phrase.” 211 
8. Ninth Circuit:  A North/South Divide? 
Considering the volume and nature of its trademark-related 
caseload, the Ninth Circuit’s case law on abbreviation marks is 
surprisingly sparse.  The appellate opinions are unreported or 
unpublished.  The district court decisions are few, and their reasoning is 
underdeveloped.  The only theme that emerges from these opinions is 
that, in California, abbreviations are more likely to be protected by 
courts in the Northern District. 
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision treating initials as 
inherently descriptive in CPP Insurance Agency, Inc. v. General Motors 
Corp.212  In a decision that was affirmed without a reported opinion, the 
Central District of California held that “CPP,” which stood for the 
descriptive phrase “consumer protection plan,” was “by its very nature 
descriptive”213:  “Initials, especially when they are initials derived from 
a corporate name, are descriptive and are entitled to protection only if 
they have acquired a secondary meaning.”214  The court offered no 
explanation for this bizarre holding.215  Unlike the district courts in the 
Second Circuit, the California court did not rely on the public domain 
status of the alphabet.  Nor did it explain the reasoning behind its 
counterintuitive conclusion that descriptiveness was “especially” 
inherent in initials derived from corporate names.216    
 
 210. Am. Historic Racing Motorcycle Ass’n, Ltd. v. Team Obsolete Promo., 33 F. Supp. 2d 
1000 (M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d without reported opinion, 233 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 211. Knights Armament Co., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 1331. 
 212. 212 U.S.P.Q. 257 (C.D.Cal.1980), aff’d without opinion, 676 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 213. Id. at 259. 
 214. Id. at 260 (emphasis added). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Two subsequent opinions from the Central District conclude, after cursory analyses, that 
the abbreviations in question lacked distinctiveness, but the trademark proponent in each case 
presented a weak argument.  In Aminolabs, Inc. v. Natural Organics, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 783 
(C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d without opinion, 825 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1987), the Central District held that 
“DLPA” was generic for a food supplement consisting of D- and L-phenylalanine, because it was 
known in the scientific literature by that abbreviation and the plaintiff did not seem to have 
advertised its product, thus making it unlikely that consumers could develop any perceptions as to 
the mark.  In Ford Motor Co. v. Ultra Coachbuilders, Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356 (C.D. Cal. 
2000), aff’d, 238 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpub. mem. opinion), the court held that the 
unregistered abbreviation “QVM” was descriptive merely because it stood for the descriptive phrase 
“quality vehicle modifier.”  Because the underlying phrase was a “self-laudatory term” describing a 
characteristic of Ford’s limousine conversion program, the court assumed that this was equally true 
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More recently, the Central District held that the “DMS” component 
of “TrackerDMS” (an unregistered mark) was descriptive simply 
because “DMS” stood for the descriptive phrase “Dealer Management 
Software.”217  In making this conclusory determination, the court did not 
discuss any evidence of consumer perceptions.218  
In contrast, a 2009 decision from the Northern District of 
California, Vertos Medical, Inc. v. Globus Medical, Inc.,219 held that 
“MILD,” which stood for the generic phrase “minimally invasive lumbar 
decompression,” was an arbitrary mark.220  The court reached this 
conclusion despite the fact that at least some of the plaintiff’s marketing 
materials explained the acronym’s derivation, and thus arguably 
“taught” consumers to equate the acronym with the underlying generic 
phrase.221  “MILD” was a registered mark, and the court found that the 
defendant’s evidence of genericness was simply insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of validity.222  In assessing the strength of the mark, the 
court focused entirely on the acronym, disregarding the underlying 
phrase.223  Because “MILD” neither described nor suggested “anything 
to do with spinal surgery,” the court held that it was arbitrary and 
“moderately strong.”224  Reflecting the same phenomenon seen in the 
Blisscraft,225 Merritt Forbes,226 and AHRMA227 cases, the fact that the 
acronym resembled an actual word which did not describe the product or 
service may have displaced the underlying generic phrase from the 
consumer’s mind.228  However, nothing in the Vertos opinion indicates 
that the court consciously considered this factor.229 
 
of the abbreviation.  In this case, the court had no reason to delve deeper into the analysis; the 
plaintiff presented a particularly weak case, offering no evidence that the mark had ever been used 
as a source indicator.   
 217. Finance Express LLC v. Nowcom Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 218. Id. 
 219. 2009 WL 3740709 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009). 
 220. Id. at *5. 
 221. Id. at *3. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at *5. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-702 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 226. Merrit Forbes & Co., Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 227. Am. Historic Racing Motorcycles Ass’n v. Team Obsolete Promo., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1000 
(M.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d without reported opinion, Am. Historic v. Team Obsolete, 233 F.3d 577 
(11th Cir. 2000). 
 228. Vertos Medical, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09-1411 PJH, 2009 WL 3740709 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 6, 2009).  
 229. Id. 
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In China International Travel Service, Inc. v. China & Asia Travel 
Service, Inc., 230 the Northern District held that “CITS,” an unregistered 
abbreviation for “China International Travel Services,” was either 
arbitrary or suggestive.  It gave three reasons:  (1) “Acronyms of full 
business names are commonly protected as trademarks,” (2) the 
defendant had “acknowledged” the inherent distinctiveness of “CITS” 
by filing its own trademark registrations for similar marks, and (3) the 
“plaintiff ha[d] made long, prominent use” of the mark.231  The court did 
not discuss whether the underlying phrase was descriptive, whether the 
plaintiff’s marketing materials presented the abbreviation separately 
from the underlying phrase, or how consumers actually perceived the 
abbreviation.232 
In 2011, the Northern District rejected Apple’s attempt to enjoin 
Amazon from using the term “App Store,” without even noting that 
“App” is an abbreviation for the generic term “application.”233  While 
Apple argued that “App Store” is suggestive,234 and Amazon argued that 
the phrase is generic,235 the court rejected both characterizations, treating 
the phrase as descriptive.236  Some abbreviations, it seems, transcend 
their status as abbreviations and enter the lexicon, thus becoming subject 
to the same analysis as traditional word marks.   
As in other circuits, the presumption of validity that applies to 
federally registered abbreviations has generally led the district courts in 
the Ninth Circuit to uphold such marks, notwithstanding the 
descriptiveness of the underlying phrases.237  Therefore, if Apple 
succeeds in its effort to obtain a federal service mark registration for 
“App Store,”238 a court will be even more likely to ignore the origin of 
“App” as an abbreviation of a generic term.  
 
 230. No. 08–cv–01293 JSW (MEJ), 2008 WL 5480840 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008). 
 231. Id. at *6-7. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C 11-1327 PJH, 2011 WL 2638191 (N.D. Cal. July 
6, 2011). 
 234. Id. at *2-3. 
 235. Id. at *5. 
 236. Id. at *7. 
 237. Ricks v. BMEzine.com, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-01174-PMP-GWF, 2010 WL 2985795 (D. 
Nev. July 26, 2010) (upholding registered mark “BME” for “body modification ezine” because 
defendant failed to prove that consumers perceived it simply as shorthand for a generic expression); 
Vertos Med., Inc. v Globus Med., Inc., No. C 09–1411 PJH, 2009 WL 3740709 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 
2009) (finding insufficient evidence to rebut presumption of validity for registered mark MILD, 
even though it stood for descriptive phrase “mildly invasive lumbar decompression”).   
 238. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77525433 (filed July 17, 2008).  Microsoft is 
opposing the registration, on the ground that “App Store” is generic.  U.S. Trademark Opposition 
Serial No. 91195582 (filed July 6, 2010). 
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9. Fifth Circuit:  Possible Rejection of Modern Optics 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit offers little jurisprudence 
on the trademark analysis of abbreviations.  Courts at both the district 
and appellate levels have addressed the trademark status of the American 
Automobile Association’s registered and incontestable “AAA” mark 
without ever considering whether consumers perceived it as the 
equivalent of the underlying phrase.  A 1985 district court decision held 
that the mark was arbitrary, 239 and in an unrelated 1991 decision240 the 
Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion with little analysis.  The 1991 
case was poorly argued on the defendant’s side,241 which may explain 
the appellate court’s complete failure to consider whether consumers 
perceived “AAA” as an abbreviation for the name of the automobile 
club or simply as a self-laudatory term (i.e., descriptive),242 or whether 
the name of the automobile club was itself descriptive or generic.  
Skirting these issues, the Fifth Circuit simply stated that “AAA” was not 
generic because it “is not a class of services, but instead identifies the 
source of those services.”243  While both opinions, in effect, evaluated 
“AAA” independently of the underlying expression, which would be 
consistent with Modern Optics,244 they are such weak precedents that 
they cannot be seen as reliable indicators of the prevailing law in this 
Circuit.245 
Moreover, a later opinion from the Fifth Circuit could be read as 
rejecting Modern Optics.246  In Society of Financial Examiners v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners,247 the court addressed an 
infringement claim involving the federally registered “CFE” designation, 
used by one party to signify “Certified Financial Examiner” and by 
another to signify “Certified Fraud Examiner.”  The court held that 
material facts needed to be resolved in order to determine whether 
 
 239. American Automobile Ass’n (Inc.) v. AAA Insurance Agency, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. 
Tex. 1985), held that AAA was arbitrary in connection with insurance services, because it was 
neither suggestive nor descriptive of those services, nor a generic term for such services.  At no 
point did the court consider the distinctiveness of the underlying phrase, American Automobile 
Association, or whether consumers perceived AAA as the equivalent of that phrase.   
 240. Am. Auto. Ass’n v. AAA Legal Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 241. Sadly, the appellee’s brief speaks for itself.  See Brief for Appellee, Am. Auto. Ass’n v. 
AAA Legal Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-8233), 1990 WL 10083387. 
 242. Self-laudatory terms are generally treated as descriptive.  See Platinum Home Mortg. 
Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 243. Am. Auto. Ass’n, 930 F.2d at 1121. 
 244. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 245. See supra notes 241-43. 
 246. Modern Optics, Inc., 234 F.2d at 504. 
 247. 41 F.3d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1103 (1995). 
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“CFE” was perceived as a source indicator or as a designation of a 
person’s professional qualifications (in which case, the court noted, it 
would be generic).248  The appellate court did not reach its own 
conclusion as to the distinctiveness of the designation, but quoted 
cryptically from Blinded Veterans Ass’n, the D.C. Circuit’s 1989 
opinion rejecting Modern Optics249:  “We need not deal separately with 
the question whether the initials [“CFE”] are generic; if the full name is 
generic, an abbreviation is treated similarly.”250  While the court did not 
expressly offer an opinion on the appropriateness of this rule, the citation 
certainly implies approval.251  Also noteworthy is the court’s willingness 
to question the distinctiveness of a federally registered service mark, 
despite the statutory presumption of validity; the court seemed doubtful 
of the mark’s ability to indicate source, although it acknowledged that 
the possibility was “not inconceivable.”252 
10. Tenth Circuit:  Leaning Toward Blinded Veterans? 
A district court in the Tenth Circuit recently adopted the rule of 
Blinded Veterans Ass’n,253 holding in Triple-I Corp. v. Hudson Associate 
Consulting, Inc. that “Certified Knowledge Manager (CKM)”—a 
designation combining an abbreviation and its underlying expression—
was generic.254  Although the mark was registered in Kansas, the 
USPTO had refused registration on the ground that it was merely 
descriptive.255  While the dispute concerned the combination mark in its 
totality, the court nonetheless cited the rule from the D.C. Circuit’s 
Blinded Veterans decision as its basis for finding that the “CKM” 
portion of the mark was generic.256 
In contrast, the same court in the related case of Hudson Associates 
Consulting, Inc. v. Weidner257 upheld the federally registered “CKL” 
mark (standing for “certified knowledge leader”).  The federal 
registration covered the combination mark “Certified Knowledge Leader 
CKL,” but the PTO required the registrant to disclaim the underlying 
 
 248. Id. at 225. 
 249. Modern Optics, Inc., 234 F.2d at 504. 
 250. Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs, 41 F.3d at 226 n.5 (quoting Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded 
Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1041 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. at 227. 
 253. Blinded Veterans Ass’n, 872 F.2d at 1035. 
 254. Triple-I Corp. v. Hudson Assocs. Consulting, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D. Kan. 2010). 
 255. Id. at 1278. 
 256. Id. at 1284-85 & n.49 (citing Blinded Veterans Ass’n, 872 F.2d 1035 at 1041 n.12).  
 257. No. 06–2461–EFM, 2010 WL 1946414 (D. Kan. May 14, 2010). 
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phrase on the ground that it was merely descriptive;258 thus, the PTO 
apparently considered “CKL” to be distinctive even though the 
underlying expression was not (and apparently later permitted 
registration of “CKL” on its own259).  While the defendant presented 
some evidence of genericness, the court found this insufficient to 
overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to registered 
marks.260 
11. Sixth Circuit:  Too Soon to Tell 
In the Sixth Circuit, the distinctiveness of abbreviation marks has 
received little attention.  Only a single unpublished district court opinion 
addresses the issue, but its approach is consistent with Modern Optics.261  
In Upjohn Co. v. American Home Products Corp.,262 the owner of the 
registered trademark “PROVERA,” a drug containing progesterone (the 
naturally occurring progestin), alleged that its mark was infringed by the 
defendant’s “PREMPRO” mark, because of the “PRO” component of 
both marks.  Because “PRO” could be understood as indicating the 
presence of progestin in each product, the court considered the 
possibility that consumers would perceive “PRO” as generic.263  In this 
case, of course, “PRO” functioned both as an abbreviation and as a 
prefix/suffix.  Rather than automatically equating the abbreviation with 
the underlying expression, the court evaluated the distinctiveness of the 
abbreviation itself.264  Citing Modern Optics and other PTO precedents 
with approval, the court wrote: 
Where dictionaries do not define a good by the contraction or 
abbreviation, where there is no history of use of the contraction by 
consumers, where few other trademarks for the good employ the 
contraction, where the term is incongruous to the good, or where the 
term does not give tolerably distinct knowledge of the good to a 
reasonably informed consumer, the contraction or abbreviation is not 
generic or descriptive.  Ultimately, these factors get at the question: 
 
 258. Id. at *11. 
 259. Id. at *12 n.90. 
 260. Id. at *12.    
 261. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956). 
 262. No. 1:95CV237, 1996 WL 33322175 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 1996) (unpub.). 
 263. Id. at *3-*4.   
 264. “An abbreviation of a generic name which still conveys to the buyer the original generic 
connotation of the abbreviated name, is still ‘generic’. . . . However, if the abbreviation is not 
recognizable as the original generic term, then the abbreviation is like a fanciful mark and 
protectable.”  Id. at *6 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 12.12[1]).   
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss1/4
9-LAFRANCE MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:32 AM 
2012] INITIAL IMPRESSIONS 237 
what does the mark mean to the reasonably informed consumer?  The 
Court assumes that the reasonably informed consumer has seen 
relevant promotional material. 
 
Here, no dictionary defines the term “pro-” as denoting progestin.  Nor 
is there a history among consumers of employing “pro-” as a short 
form for progestin.  This kind of evidence has been considered prima 
facie proof of suggestiveness.  
 
Indeed, “pro-” is so contracted a form of the name progestin that it is 
another word entirely.  The dictionary definitions for “pro-,” although 
not necessarily creatively incongruous, support a finding of 
suggestiveness. . . . Such multiple meanings are more in keeping with a 
source indicating term than a descriptive or identifying term.  Some 
exercise of the imagination is required to derive progestin from “pro-.”  
 
. . . There is no evidence indicating “pro-” has fallen into any lexicon 
as equivalent to, or directly descriptive of, progestin.265 
12. Third Circuit:  No Cohesive Approach 
The Third Circuit’s jurisprudence on abbreviations is limited to 
district court opinions and does not offer anything resembling a cohesive 
approach.  In a 1976 decision affirmed without opinion by the Third 
Circuit, the Delaware district court in Kampgrounds of America, Inc. v. 
North Delaware A-OK Campground, Inc.,266 treated the “KOA” mark, 
derived from “Kampgrounds of America,” as arbitrary or fanciful:  
“Certainly KOA alone is not a ‘meaningful word in common usage’; nor 
does it describe the services being offered.”267  Because the KOA mark 
was often displayed independently of the underlying phrase, the court 
held that the weakness and descriptiveness of that phrase did not affect 
the trademark status of the KOA mark.268  Consistent with this approach, 
a federal district court in Pennsylvania held in 2004 that the acronym 
“CNB,” standing for “County National Bank,” had acquired sufficient 
 
 265. Id. at *6-8 (citing Modern Optics, 234 F.2d at 506; McCarthy, supra, §§ 11.06[3], 
12.12[1]) (additional citations omitted). 
 266. 415 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Del.1976), aff’d without op., 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 267. Id. at 1292 (citation omitted).  The court recognized that koa is also a type of tree found in 
Hawaii, but found that consumers of campground services would be unlikely to make this 
association.  Id. at 1292 n.7. 
 268. Id. at 1291-92. 
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secondary meaning to be a trademark, even if the underlying phrase was 
generic.269  
More confusing, however, is AFP Imaging Corp. v. Photo-Therm, 
Inc.,270 a 1989 opinion in which the New Jersey district court held that 
the registered mark “AFP,” as applied to automatic film processing 
equipment made by plaintiff AFP Imaging, was not generic.  Although it 
appears clear that the abbreviation was derived from the phrase 
“automatic film processor (or processing),” the opinion does not mention 
the provenance of the abbreviation, and it is possible that no evidence 
was presented on that point.271  Because the mark was registered, the 
burden was on the defendant to present evidence of genericness; 
however, the defendant’s argument seems to have been based solely on 
the fact that the defendant was using the term in a generic sense.272  
Rather than deciding the case based on the burden of proof, the court 
based its conclusion on the inscrutable observation that the plaintiff 
“use[d] the designation AFP to identify that the product in question is 
made by AFP imaging [sic].”273  The court did not even consider the 
question of how the “AFP” designation was perceived by the relevant 
consumers, which would have been the crucial inquiry under Modern 
Optics.274    
III.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
One early trademark authority observed: 
Corporate names or parts of these names when used to designate goods 
or business houses, or as trade “nicknames” are trade names pure and 
simple, in most instances, and can be protected as such.  The 
commercial nickname, or abbreviated name, is often more valuable, far 
better known, and more carefully guarded from use by rivals than the 
formal or full name from which it is taken. . . . One hears or sees the 
full corporate name used seldom in comparison to the number of times 
the nickname is used.275 
 
 269. CNB Fin. Corp. v. CNB Cmty. Bank (IO), No. Civ.A. 03–6945(PBT), 2004 WL 2434878, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2004) (unpub.). 
 270. AFP Imaging Corp. v. Photo-Therm, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at *1536. 
 273. Id. at *1537. 
 274. Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504 (C.C.P.A. 1956).   
 275. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A & P Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (E.D. Pa.1937) 
(quoting HARRY DWIGHT NIMS, NIMS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 246, 170 (3d 
ed. 1929)).  On trademark protection for consumer-coined nicknames, see Peter M. Brody, What’s 
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Whatever the truth of this observation as a matter of branding and 
marketing strategy, it is clear that the validity or strength of 
abbreviations as trademarks is uncertain when the underlying expression 
(be it a corporate name or some other unit of information) does not itself 
qualify for trademark protection, or does so only weakly.  While it 
would be desirable for a uniform rule to emerge from the current array 
of competing approaches, such a result is unlikely in the near future.  
The application of federal trademark law should in theory be consistent 
across the circuits.  When it comes to the trademark status of 
abbreviations, however, disharmony is the order of the day. 
Nonetheless, a few observations emerge from surveying the current 
landscape of decisional law.   
First, the PTO and CCPA approaches, as exemplified by Modern 
Optics,276 are much more favorable to the trademark proponent than the 
approaches that have developed in several circuits, most notably the 
Seventh Circuit, with its “heavy burden” on the party seeking to 
establish the distinctiveness of an abbreviation, and the D.C. Circuit, 
with its per se rule that abbreviations of generic terms are necessarily 
generic themselves.  Thus, in many cases it will be easier to obtain 
federal registration for an abbreviation mark than to invoke protection 
under common law or under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act277 in the 
context of an infringement proceeding.  This is ironic, because many 
marks that are protectable under section 43(a) or common law are barred 
from federal registration.278   
Second, despite the skepticism with which abbreviation marks are 
viewed in some of the circuits, most courts are reluctant to hold that a 
challenger’s evidence of genericism or lack of secondary meaning is 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to 
federally registered marks.279  This is another reason why trademark 
owners should seek federal registration of their abbreviation marks.  No 
 
in a Nickname? Or Can Public Use Create Private Rights?, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1123, 1125 
(2005). 
 276. Modern Optics, Inc., 234 F.2d 504. 
 277. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 278. Examples include: (1) personal names of celebrities, entertainers, and sportspeople, (2) 
marks that are deemed immoral, scandalous or disparaging, and (3) titles of individual literary, 
dramatic, or musical works.  See also James E. Harper, Single Literary Titles and Federal 
Trademark Protection: The Anomaly Between the USPTO and Case Law Precedents, 45 IDEA 77 
(2004).  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
 279. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a).  There are, of course, exceptions.  See supra text 
accompanying note 254. 
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such presumption attaches to unregistered abbreviations,280 thus placing 
them at the mercy of each federal court’s individual philosophy.  It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the statutory presumption of 
validity will be weaker in jurisdictions such as the Seventh Circuit, 
which places an especially “heavy burden” on the proponent of a mark 
that abbreviates a generic or merely descriptive phrase.  And even if a 
court rules that the presumption of validity has not been overcome, the 
court could still hold, in a likelihood of confusion analysis, that the 
abbreviation is a weak mark because of its generic or descriptive 
associations. 
Third, in at least some federal courts, abbreviations of generic or 
descriptive phrases seem to have a greater chance of achieving 
protection if the abbreviation is an acronym that resembles a word and 
thereby conveys a dictionary meaning unrelated to that of the underlying 
phrase—for example, “Poly,” “BEARS,” “TOP’s,” “MILD,” and 
“ABLE”—as opposed to a mere initialism, like “WSI.”281  The 
resemblance to an unrelated word allows consumers to perceive the 
acronym as an arbitrary mark, and this may tend to displace the 
competing mental association that otherwise connects the acronym to the 
underlying generic or descriptive phrase (what the Seventh Circuit called 
the “natural assumption that initials do generally stand for 
something”282).  This will not be helpful, of course, in those instances—
e.g.,“duck,” for amphibious motor vehicles—where the seemingly 
arbitrary word has itself suffered genericide, becoming synonymous 
with the goods or services.  
Finally, in at least some circuits (e.g., the Seventh and Eleventh), 
the validity of an abbreviation mark for an underlying generic or 
 
 280. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 
1051 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 281. The case of the “BADASS” trademark arguably presents an exception, although that 
particular acronym has never been challenged as generic or descriptive.  Instead, the ordinary 
meaning of the term led the trademark examiner to refuse registration on the grounds that the mark 
was “scandalous or immoral” under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  The T.T.A.B. reversed, largely because 
the term was an acronym for “Bettencourt Acoustically Designed Audio Sound Systems.”  In re Leo 
Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978); see Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of 
the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) of Trademark Law after 
Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 207-08 (2005); Regan Smith, Trademark 
Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 451, 461 (2007).  However, the Board did not even inquire whether consumers encountering 
the mark would actually recognize it as an acronym.  The Board also stated that the term was 
“susceptible to a wholly innocent pronunciation,” without specifying what that pronunciation was, 
and without citing any evidence that consumers actually used the “innocent” pronunciation.  
 282. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
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descriptive expression will be imperiled to the extent that the labeling 
and marketing materials for the goods or services juxtapose the mark 
with the generic or descriptive content to which it corresponds.  This has 
the opposite effect of selecting an acronym that conjures up an arbitrary 
word; instead of displacing the mark’s generic or descriptive 
associations, this juxtaposition will tend to reinforce those associations, 
by “teaching” consumers that the abbreviation is not a source indicator 
but an indicator of content.  As illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Welding Services,283 where the trademark proponent relies on 
circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning to validate the mark, this 
failure to distinguish the abbreviation from the underlying generic or 
descriptive content can negate the impact of otherwise-persuasive 
evidence 
 
 283. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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